The end of the war in Italy - 80 years on ( Part 2) Crossing the Po - 21st April to 30th April 1945

On  21^st   April, the  Fifth  Army  launched its advance to  the  Po  with II  Corps  on  the  right  and  IV  Corps  on  the  left . The plan was for all  troops drive to  the  Po  on  the Borgoforteto -Sermide line,  with Ostiglia  as  dividing  point between  corps.  General  Truscott's  emphasised speed. For  the  first  time  in  the  Italian  campaign  the Germans were falling  back  in  terrain  suitable  for swift pursuit. They were  short  of  vehicles  and  fuel and  were  retreating across  an  open  valley  with  a  superb  network  of  roads  for the American mechanized  forces. The river stood between the Germans and their retreat.   

Reading the official history of the multiple river crossings by different  units , became rather confusing, so here is an attempt to simplify . First it is necessary to understand the geography. In the satellite photo below, you can see the Po running through the centre of the photo. At the foot of the photo you can see the Apennines,, the mountain chain running up the centre of Italy , until finally, along the line of Bologna to Modena, the mountains finish and the Po Valley starts. The Allies had been fighting their way up the mountainous spine of Italy, in inhospitable terrain and bad weather until by Spring of 1945, they were finally within sight of the Po valley and its easier terrain. In the top of the photo, you can see Lake Garda and beyond that the Alps and the Brenner Pass. The Brenner Pass was the only way out for the large German armies trapped in Italy, so you can see why the Allied plans involved a swift crossing of the Po and a dash towards th Alps to cut of German egress from Italy. In the following account, numerous rivers are mentioned. It was not as easy as heading north from Bologna to the Po. The route involved first crossing the river Panaro , the final right-hand tributary to the Po, which runs right across Emilia-Romagna in a north-easterly direction: from its source close to the Apennine watershed, The Panaro runs through Vignola, Finale Emilia and Bondeno entering the Po at Ficarola to the West of Ferrara. If you see these rivers in summer, they are often dry ,but in Spring following snow melts and rain in the mountains, both the Panaro and the Po, would have  been at their widest extent  and most difficult to cross.

Next we need a bit of simplification on all the units involved.  The Allied forces were divided between the Fifth Army in The Centre and the East  and the British Eighth Amy on the East. The Fifth Army was  split into two corps , IV  Corps to the west of Bologna and II Corps in the Centre . It helps to understand that is going on to understand the Order of battle of each Army. Without going into granular detail , the main units were.

In  the  advance  to  the  Po, Allied units  pushing  forward in the centre ran  into  comparatively  light  resistance;  on either  flank  they  found  the  Germans willing  and  able  to  put  up stiff opposition.  On  the  left  flank  the  German  Fourteenth  Army had collapsed  west  of  the  Reno  and  the  remnants  of  XIV  Panzer  Corps fled  north  of  Bologna,  LI  Gebirgs Armeekorps, still  relatively  intact and  west  of the American  attack,  instituted  an orderly  withdrawal  from  its mountain  positions  north  across  Highway  9.  Consequently,  the thrusts northwest  along  that  highway  by  the  1st  Armored  Division and  then by  the  34th  Division  met  a  series  of  well-organized  delaying  forces  in  the  vicinity  of  Modena  and  Parma . On  the  right flank the German  1 Fallschirmjager and  4 Fallschirmjager (Parachute)Divisions fought  fiercely  to  cover  the  exposed  right  flank  of  Tenth Army  as  it  fell  back  across  the  Po before the  British  Eighth  Army. in  the  centre  due  north  of  Bologna,  there  was a  complete gap  in  the  German's  line. With  the  exception  of  the  Panaro  River  line,  where  the Germans  made  a  futile  effort  to  hold open the  bridges  at Bomporto  and Camposanto, the resistance  encountered  was  disorganized  and  ineffective,  consisting chiefly  of  small  knots  of  soldiers  dug  in  around  houses  or along  canal  banks.  The  Panaro  River  defence  line  was  makeshift and  proved no  major  obstacle;  both  the  Bomporto  and Camposanto  bridges,  ready  for  demolition  though  they  were, were  taken  intact  by  troops  of  IV Corps  on  21-22  April  and  so speeded up the  race  to  the  Po.

 IV Corps

In the West, General  Crittenberger  utilized  the 1st  Armored  Division  on  the  left,  the  10th  Mountain  Division (reinforced)  in  the  centre,  and  the  85th  Division  on  the right. The  Brazilian  1st  Division  was immediately west  of  the  1st  Armored  Division  and  was  to  reconnoitre  aggressively and  follow  enemy  withdrawals;  the  365th  and  371st  Infantry  on the  lightly  held  extreme  left  were  also  to  continue  following  the enemy. 

The 10^th Mountain Division was commanded by Brig. Gen. George P Hays. Ever since Finland’s “Winter War” with the Soviet Union, American planners had been considering the need for a specialist Mountain Warfare unit. The utility of such a unit was confirmed when they received reports that Greek mountain troops had held back superior numbers of unprepared Italian troops in the Albanian mountains during the Greco-Italian War. The Italians had lost 25,000 men in the campaign because of their lack of preparedness to fight in the mountains. On 22 October 1941, General Marshall decided to form the first battalion of mountain warfare troops for a new mountain division. On 8 December 1941, the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent, the army activated its first mountain unit, the 87th Mountain Infantry Battalion (which was later expanded to the 87th Infantry Regiment) at Fort Lewis, Washington. It was the first mountain warfare unit in U.S. military history. The National Ski Patrol took on the unique role of recruiting for the 87th Infantry Regiment and later the division. Army planners favoured recruiting experienced skiers for the unit instead of trying to train standing troops in mountain warfare, so they recruited from schools, universities, and ski clubs for the unit.^[ The 87th trained in harsh conditions, including Mount Rainier's 14,411-foot peak, throughout 1942 as more recruits were brought in to form the division.

Early  on  the  21^st April the 10th Mountain Division sent ahead Task Force Duff, consisting of tanks, tank destroyers, engineers, a battalion of infantry, and the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron under Brig. Gen. Robinson E. Duff, towards Bomporto on the river Panaro. A rapid advance along the narrow roads, bypassing all towns continued throughout the day opposed only by snipers and occasional machine guns. The task force was out of communication with the remainder of the division much of the time, but the entire division advanced as fast as possible in the wake of the spearhead. A steady stream of German prisoners from a great variety of units marched south unguarded alongside the northbound Allied columns. By 1600 the Bomporto bridge over the Panaro was securely held by Task Force Duff, and the engineers began to remove the unexploded demolition charges under the bridge. On the next day the task force again sped ahead, this time 24 miles to the town of San Benedetto Po; by 2300 the division was assembling on the south bank of the Po, using its own trucks and captured enemy vehicles to shuttle troops forward.

On  the  morning  of  the  23^rd , General  Hays  prepared  for  a  scratch  crossing  of  the Po. During the  morning  fifty M2  assault  boats  with  paddles  were  brought forward  from  the  corps  dump  and  dispersed  along  the  south bank, A  battalion  of  self-propelled 105mm  howitzers  and  a battery  of  5.5 -inch guns  were  ready  to  give  supporting  fire  for the  crossing,  H-hour  was  set  finally  at  noon,  and  preparations for  the  initial  crossing  by  the  1st  Battalion,  87th  Mountain  Infantry, were  completed  hastily.  Though  a  murderous  barrage from  enemy  antiaircraft  guns  was  received  in  the  assembly  area a  few  minutes  before  the  jump-off,  the  1st  Battalion  paddled  the 300  yards  across  the  river  on  schedule  and  was  followed  immediately by  the  remainder  of  the  87th  Mountain  Infantry.  The  Germans resisted with artillery, machine-gun,  mortar,  and  sniper  fire  at  the and by 1745  the 87th Mountain  Infantry established  a  bridgehead 2000  yards  square  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Po  River.  The 85th  Mountain  Infantry  was  over  by 1800,  and  the  86th  Mountain Infantry  crossed  during  the  night. 

Due to the limited preparation time, the  bridgehead  was  difficult  to  support  or  to supply but on 24  April engineer bridge crews  began  the  construction of  a pontoon  bridge  and  a  treadway  bridge.  A  battalion of  DUKWs  reached  the  river  early  in  the  evening  of  the  23d  and assisted  with  the  later  parts  of  the  crossing.  By  the  afternoon  of  the  24^th a cable ferry was also operating ,  and  light  tanks  and  guns began  to  cross  to  the  north  bank.  By  dark  the  10th  Mountain Division  also held  a  damaged  bridge  over  the  Mincio  at Governolo  and  had  expanded  its  bridgehead  well  beyond  the  latter river.  American troops had  broken  the  Po  defence  line;  the  situation  was  ripe  for  further exploitation  as  soon  as  the  85th  Division had crossed. 

The 85th Division had  secured  the  line  of  the Samoggia  on  the  morning of  the  21st  and  started  for  the bridge over the  Panaro  at  Camposanto  in the  afternoon.  Shortly after  dawn  on  the  22^nd   the  338th Infantry  in the  lead  on  tanks  and  trucks  reached  the Panaro;  then the  337th  Infantry  passed  through  and  battled  against  enemy antiaircraft  and other troops in Camposanto.  Although  the  vital bridge  was  secured  before  it  could  be  demolished,  clearing the  town  proved  an  all-day  battle,  even  with  the  aid  of  the  6^th  South  African  Armoured  Division  on  the  right, the  bulk  of the  regiment  was  not  able  to  cross  the  Panaro  until  nightfall. All  night  the  337th  Infantry  pushed  on,  and  by  1045,  23rd  April, the  3rd  Battalion  reached  the  Po  at  Quingentole.  

A  line  was  established along  the  river  to  head  off  any  escaping  Germans,  and  the 85th  Reconnaissance  Troop  moved  on to  Revere on the south bank of the Po  and  partially cleared  the  town, although the  bridge  was found  to  have  been wrecked  several  days  before.  Not knowing that they had been beaten to the river, German forces were  still  streaming  north .  During  the  night  one  group  tried  to  force  a  crossing  but was  driven  away,  and  the  next  day  the  88^th Division  also  had some  trouble  at  Revere  with  Germans  who  had  infiltrated  back into  the  town  after  85^th   Division  units  moved  out  to  assemble for  the  crossing  at  Quingentole. Further to the west, along the Po, on 23^rd April Combat  Command  A  arrived at Guastalla  and Luzzaro  to the  west  of  the  10th  Mountain  Division ,  IV  Corps  now  held  all  its  stretch  of  the  Po and  even  had  one  division  over. The  left  flank  of  this penetration  was  protected  until  the  23d  by  Combat  Command  B, battling  up  Highway  9  and  blocking  the  roads  from  the  mountains.  The  Germans  fought  over  the Panaro  crossings east of  Modena  on  the  22^nd and the next day at the river Secchia to the west, where Combat Command B, driving nearly due west south of the Highway, was stopped. Modena itself was largely bypassed and left to the partisans to clear. On the 24t the 34th Division came up from Bologna and relieved the armour on Highway 9 . Farther to the left the Brazilian 1st Division emerged into the plain late on the 23d at Marano and Vignola and moved northwest along the foothills south of Highway 9. 

II Corps 

On  21  April,  as  Bologna  was  being  cleared,  II  Corps  struck north  for  the  Po. Units in the  centre  ran  into  less  difficulty  than  those  moving up the  right. The  Panaro  River  was  more  strongly  defended  around  Finale  on  the  eastern boundary  than  it  was  in  the  direction  of  Camposanto.  The  1 Fallschirmjager  and  4 Fallschirmjager  Divisions  suffered  heavy  losses  but  successfully covered  Tenth  Army's  flank as it retreated  across  the  Po;  the junction  of  Fifth and the British Eighth  Army near Bondeno  was  effected too  late  for  maximum  success. Initially  the  6th  South  African  Armoured  Division  was  to  be  in the  lead,  first  to  hold  crossings  over  the  Reno  northwest  of  Bologna until  relieved  by  infantry,  then  to  take  and  hold  the  important road  centre  of  San  Giovanni,  and  thereafter  to  cover  the  entire corps  front,  followed  by  the  88th Division  on  the  left  and  the 91st  Division  on  the  right.  On  the  21st  the  armour  cleared  the right  bank  of  the  Reno  north  of  Bologna;  after  it  had  halted  for the  night  the  88th  Division  passed  through  to  take  San  Giovanni. 

The following  day  the  11^th  South  African  Armoured  Brigade on the east flank set  out  for  Finale  on  the Panaro,  and  the 12  South  African Motorised  Brigade  started  for  Camposanto  on  the  west.  Both units  were  held  up  by  the Germans  and  the  division  did  not get  across  the  Panaro  until  the  morning  of  the  23rd.  Contact  was  made  with  the  6th  Armoured  Division  of  Eighth  Army two  miles  east  of  Finale.  II  Corps   now moved  the  South  Africans  to  a  zone  of  their  own  on the  right  flank  running  up  to  Felonica  on  the  Po,  which  advanced elements  reached  on  the  afternoon  of  the  24th.  In  the  last  two days  bridging  the  Panaro  caused  the  South  Africans  as  much  delay as  enemy  opposition;  part  of  the  division  crossed  at  Camposanto on  the  23^rd  and  other  elements  used  the  91st  Division  bridge halfway  between  Finale  and  Camposanto.  A  division  bridge  was opened  at  Finale  on  the  morning  of  the  24th,  and  the  rest  of  the 6th  South  African  Armoured  Division  then  moved  up  to  Felonica preparatory  to  crossing  the  Po. 

To  the  left  the  88th  and  91st  Divisions  had  already  reached  the river  Po and  were  putting  their  leading  elements  over.  The  88^th Division  cleared  San  Giovanni  on  the  night  of  21-22  April  and reached  the  Panaro  east  of  Camposanto  in  the  middle  of  the afternoon  on  the  22nd.  The  South  Africans  had  arrived  at  the  river a  little  to  the  west  some  three  hours  previously;  over  in  the  IV  Corps zone  the 10th  Mountain  Division  had  already  crossed,  and  the  85th Division  was  clearing  Camposanto  preparatory  to  crossing.  Elements on  the  right,  however,  had  not  yet  come  up  to  the  Panaro. In  the  zone  of  the  88th  Division  the  913th  Field  Artillery  Battalion laid  down  a  heavy  curtain  of  fire  to  smother  a  small  band of  Germans  north  of  the  river;  the  2nd  Battalion,  351st  Infantry, then  moved  over  on  a  semi -demolished  bridge,  and  a  short  distance to  the  east  the  1st  Battalion  crossed  on  improvised  rafts  of timbers  and  doors. 

On  the  23rd  the  350th  Infantry  passed  through  the  351st  Infantry and  with  the  349th  Infantry  on  the  right  dashed  towards the  Po.  The 349th  Infantry reached  the  Po  north  of  Carbonara  at  2000  and  fanned out  along  the  river  bank  to  gather  in  the  thousands  of  German stragglers  in  the  vicinity.  The  350th  Infantry,  shifting  over  to the  left  astride  Highway  12,  arrived  at  the  river  a  little  later. The  88th  Division  had  closed  in  on  the  Po  where  the  Germans were  assembling  their  shattered  forces  for  the  escape  across  the river.  The  prisoner  haul reached  its  peak  in  the  88th  Division  zone.  From  noon  on 23  April  to  noon  on  25  April,  approximately  11,000  prisoners were  taken,  the  bulk  of  them  from  the  65th  Grenadier,  305th Grenadier,  and  8th  Mountain  Divisions.  These included the first German  division  commander  taken  during  the  whole  Italian campaign,  Major  General  Von  Schellwitz,  commander  of  the 305th  Grenadier  Division. By  midnight  of  the  22^nd April advanced elements of the 363rd Infantry, riding tanks and tank destroyers, reached the Panaro. There the infantry dismounted from the vehicles and crossed the river by foot bridges halfway between Finale and Camposanto while the armour and trucks went around to the Camposanto bridge. Movement beyond the Panaro was unopposed until a few miles southwest of Sermide, where the American forces lost two tanks to a self-propelled gun in a sharp fire fight. The Germans disengaged thereafter and apparently got away across the Po, for no more resistance was encountered as the 363d Infantry moved north to reach the river banks near Carbonara west of Sermide at 0800, 24 April. 

On the division right the 62nd Infantry was held up by the battle of Germans and South Africans below Finale and also by orders to gain contact with Eighth Army; when the 6th South African Armoured Division took over the right flank of II Corps, two battalions of the 362nd Infantry were entrucked and across the Camposanto bridge to continue the attack north, closing in at Sermide about noon on the 24th. By the end of 24 April ,the Fifth Army, large parts of which had already crossed the Po, held the south bank of the river on a line extending for about 60 miles from the Taro River to the Eighth Army boundary at Felonica, with the 1st Armored, 10th Mountain, 85th, 88th, 91st, and 6th South African Armoured Divisions along the banks from west to east. Since the 21st April these troops had covered 40 miles from the mountain to the river through the smashed centre of the German armies. Driven to desperation, the Germans had taken to the roads in daylight and had thus laid themselves open to Allied air attacks. Increasing numbers of abandoned vehicles and equipment attested to the disorganization in the German retreat Clear weather on the 23rd once more gave Allied planes free rein, German columns converging on the river crossings were blasted into shambles of wrecked and burning junk. In the period 21-25 April, the Fifth Army took approximately 30,000 prisoners at a cost of 1,397 casualties. Captured rear echelon personnel were commonplace — hospitals, bakeries in which the bread was still warm, a paymaster with his payroll, and personnel units. Though the bulk of the German forces managed to get across the Po, the loss in equipment augured ill for any extended stand on their part thereafter. 

As they fled back across the Po, the shattered German armies in Italy were a shadow of their former selves. There now followed eight days of frantic efforts to escape a relentless pursuer, eight days of disintegration of leadership, organization, and the will to resist in the face of inevitable defeat. North of Bologna their centre was completely smashed, and the forces on either flank, though still in fair condition, were no longer attempting to give battle south of the river; they were concerned rather with efforts to prevent the spread of the penetration to the east or west while they made good their escape. The Fifth Army at the Po was nearer the Alpine exits than the enemy forces on either side. With the disintegration of German forces apparent. General Truscott ordered the attacking divisions to cross the Po as soon as possible and to drive as far as they could. 

IV Corps 

On the IV Corps front Infantry  crossings were  begun  by  the  10th  Mountain  Division  on  the  23rd  in  the  face of  determined  though  insufficient  opposition,  and  by  the  24th the  operation  was  in  full  swing.  The  85th  Division  put  its  first forces  across  the Po  without  firing  a  shot,  established  ferries, and  placed  assault  barges  in  operation. Bridging  the  river  thereafter  was  a  mad  scramble  in  which little  went  according  to  plan.  The  elaborate  preparations  made by  the  engineers  before  our  attack  began  had  been  based  on  the assumption  that  II  Corps  would  probably  make  the  crossing  with the  85^th  Division in the  lead.  Instead, three  divisions  of  IV  Corps arrived  on  the  river  bank  ahead  of  any  units  of  II  Corps,  and  the 10th  Mountain  Division  actually  made  the  first  crossing.  On  the morning  of  the  23d  all  readily  available  II  Corps  bridging  equipment— assault  craft  for  one  regimental  combat  team  and  one M1  treadway  bridge — was  directed  to  IV  Corps,  but  arrived piecemeal;  the  M1 bridge  convoy  started  for Quingentole,  too far  to  the  east,  but  finally  reached  San  Benedetto  on  the  next morning. Work  on  this  bridge  was  begun  after  noon  on  the  24th  but was  delayed  until  missing  cables  and  ropes  arrived.  At  1930  the same  day  a  heavy  pontoon  bridge  was  started three  miles  upstream at  the  site  of  a  former  floating  bridge.  Work  proceeded  rapidly during  the  night, and  early  in  the  morning,  as  the  men  began  to slow  up  because  of  fatigue,  two  fresh  companies  were  put  on  the pontoon  bridge  and  a  whole  battalion  on  the  treadway  bridge.  By 1230,  25th  April,  the  treadway  bridge  was  opened  for  traffic,  and four  hours  later  the  pontoon  bridge  was  open.

Both  bridges,  each  over  900  feet  long,  were  ready  approximately  twenty- four  hours  after  beginning  of  construction  despite handicaps  such  as  inexperienced  labour  on  the  pontoon and the  necessity of  putting  in  double  anchors  and an  overhead  cable to  hold  the  treadway  in  the  swift,  soft-bottomed  river.  Within forty-eight  hours  an  armoured  division,  an  infantry  division  reinforced with  armour,  and  part  of  a  II  Corps  division  had  passed  over without  incident.  The  burden  of  bridging  first  the  Po,  then  the  Adige and  the  Brenta,  all  three  major  rivers,  placed  a  heavy  load  on  the engineers  of  II  Corps.

While  the  bridges  were under construction  the Fifth  Army  was  already  far  north of  the  river.  By  Army orders  on  the  24^th April,  IV  Corps  on  the  left, employing  initially  three  divisions  north  of  the  river,  was  to drive  north  on  the  axis  San  Benedetto-Mantua- Verona  with  the important  Villafranca  Airfield  and  the  city  of  Verona  as  the main  objectives. They would also dispatch  strong,  fast  detachments north  to  the  Alpine foothills  where  they  would  turn  west  to  drive  along  the  northern edge  of  the  Po  Valley  through  the  cities  of Brescia  and Bergamo and  block  the  routes  of  egress  from Italy  between  Lake Garda and  Lake  Como.  II  Corps  on  the  right  was  to  move  north  along the  axis  of  Highway  12,  which  enters  Verona  from  the  south, to  seize  the  west  bank  of  the  Adige  River  from  Legnano  north  to Verona.  Full  attainment  of  the  objectives  would  block  escape routes  to  the  north  between  Verona  and  Lake  Como  and  would place  Fifth  Army  in  position  to  assault  in  strength  from  Legnano to  Lake  Garda  the  last  major  defensive  system  left  to  the  Ger-mans in  Italy,  the  Adige  River  line. Everywhere  in the Po Valley  there  were  action  and  movement , the Germans were struggling  to  get  out  of  the  plain but  disorganized  in  command and  smashed  by American  planes; while seemingly   moving  here  and there  confusion, the Fifth Army  was actually  carrying  out  a  masterful plan  to  hem  the  enemy  into  ever  narrowing  pockets.  Although the  constant  shifting  of  units  and  the  enormous  extension  of supply  lines  taxed  Army  supply  facilities  to  a  degree  never  before experienced  in  Italy,  the  advance  did  not  suffer  a  major  delay  because of  shortages.  According  to  captured  German  officers., their   plans  of  retirement  had  been  based  on  the  assumption that  even  in  the  event  of  a  breakthrough  the Fifth  Army  would have  to  stop  at  the  Po  to  await  supplies  before  resuming  the offensive. 

By 24  April  IV  Corps  had  Combat  Command  A,  the  10th Mountain  Division,  and  the  85th  Division  in  line  along  and across  the  Po  and  the  34th  Division,  the  Brazilian  1st  Division, and  two  detached  regiments  of  the  92nd  Division  protecting  its left  flank  from  Highway  9  south.  The  10th  Mountain  Division had  put  all  three  of  its  regiments,  including  artillery,  across  the Po  on  the  23d  and  24th,  On April 23, 1945, Brigadier General Robinson E. Duff, Assistant Division Commander of the 10th Mountain Division, was wounded. Colonel William O. Darby took over and “task force Duff” became  "Task Force Darby". Darby had been with the first United States combat troops sent to Europe the 34th Infantry Division, a National Guard unit known as the Red Bull. During its stay in Northern Ireland Darby became interested in the British Commandos. On June 19, 1942, the 1st Ranger Battalion was sanctioned, and Darby was put in charge of their recruitment and training under the Commandos in Achnacarry. Many of these original Rangers were volunteers from the 34th.^[7][3] In November 1942, the 1st Ranger Battalion made its first assault at Arzew, Algeria, Darby took part in the Allied invasion of the Italian mainland in September 1943, and was promoted to full colonel on December 11. The three existing Ranger battalions were effectively wiped out - killed or captured - in the disastrous Battle of Cisterna during the Anzio campaign in early February 1944, after which they were disbanded.In March 1945, Darby returned to Italy for an observation tour with five-star General of the Army Henry H. Arnold.

Verona

While  “Task Force Darby” waited  on  the  completion  of  the  corps  bridges,  patrols  and partisans  reported  enemy  withdrawals  to  the  front  during  the night  of  24-25  April.  Shortly  after  midnight  the  85th  Mountain Infantry  moved  north  to  Villafranca  Airfield,  which  it reached  by  the  middle  of  the  morning  on  the  25th.  With  no assurance  of  immediate  support  to  the  rear,  the  men  of  this  regiment had  marched  almost  20  miles,  most  of  it  in  darkness,  through strange  country,  and  without  adequate  maps.  At  dusk  Task  Force Darby  caught  up  with  the  85th  Mountain  Infantry  and  moved  on cautiously  toward  Verona,  to  find  upon  arrival  at  0600,  26  April, that  the  88th  Division  had  entered  the  city  some  eight  hours before.  

Verona had passed a number of tense hours before the Americans arrived. The German supreme command promised the bishop, Monsignor Girolamo Cardinale that the central area of Verona would  be free from fighting and destruction, provided that the population abstained from any act of hostility towards the Germans, At the same time , the Germans placed explosive charges on all the bridges of the city, including two monumental ones (Ponte Pietra and Castelvecchio). With it strategic location on the road to the Brenner Pass, Verona had been a substantial military centre for the Germans, They had substantial magazines of explosives in the outskirts of Verona and the population feared that  the retreating Nazis would detonate  them . In Avesa above the city, the quarries of Mount Arzàn held  the largest deposit of explosives in northern Italy. Hearing the rumours, a local priest Don Giuseppe Graziani rushed to the headquarters of the Platz Kommandantur and implored the German commander  to cancel the order to blow up the powder magazine of the Arzàn or at least to allow a reduction in the amount of explosive in the magazine.

In the city of Verona a car with a German  officer and some soldiers left  the railway bridge, and the occupants began detonating the explosive charges. The railway bridge was severely damaged so as to make it impassable, the car then proceeded along the left bank of  Lungadige, with the occupant  systematically  blowing up all the other bridges within a few minutes of each other Some of the modern bridges remained damaged but standing the two ancient ones crumbled, almost pulverized. After the bridges of Verona were destroyed, without warning the German soldiers blew up the ammunition depot of Corrubbio, in an  old limestone quarries on the hill overlooking the town. A massive explosion hit the entire surrounding area. About  30 people were kilòref  and msy house , destroyed, Meanwhile, up at  Avasa, a human chain made up of eight hundred men and  women, worked through the night to remove as many crates of TNT as possible from the Arzàn, transporting them to the meadow below the mountain. A spark and it would have meant death for everyone. At 6.15 a.m. on 26 April, the Germans blew up the Arzàn anyway , but after the heroic efforts of the population the night before , there were  35 thousand fewer crates of explosives and the tragedy was thus reduced by a collective action.

By  the  end  of  the 26^th, Task Force Darby was driving along the east side of Lake Garda; with the 85th Mountain Infantry at Villafranca and the 86th Mountain Infantry resting at Verona, During the early afternoon Darby returned to Verona and then followed the route of his task force northwest from the city, arriving at Bussolengo about1600 hours. A wooden bridge crossing the Adige had been found intact in the vicinity of Bussolengo, so that infantry patrols of Task Force Darby had crossed the river and were patrolling the northern bank. A few German vehicles were intercepted trying to flee north ward on Highway 12. Darby recalled these patrols to the southern bank of the Adige and, in line with the division’s new objective, ordered one battalion of the 86th with supporting tanks to continue the drive west ward and by nightfall to seize Lazise on the southeastern shores of Lake Garda, thus sealing off a possible German escape route along the the eastern shores of Lake Garda. Task Force DARBY had not only spearheaded the second longest, 24-hour divisional advance of the campaign (22.5 miles), but also had successfully cleared all enemy personnel from the area of its advance and had physically occupied a thirteen-mile front along the southern bank of the Adige from Verona to Bussolengo [and overland] to Lazise.

The  85th Division  had  by  this  time  crossed the  Po  at  Quingentole  by  rafts,  DUKWs,  and  assault boats  on  24-25  April,  and  held  the  hills  above  Verona.  On  the left  the  91st  Cavalry  Reconnaissance  Squadron  screened  the  left flank  of  the  10th  Mountain  Division.

South of the Po

Although  Fifth  Army  was  primarily  occupied  in  driving  north as  swiftly  as  possible,  it  could  not  overlook  the  sizable  block  of Germans left  in  the  mountains  west  and  south  of  Modena.  The main  drive  up  Highway  9  to  cut  off  these  forces  was  made  by the  34th  Division,  The  133rd  Infantry  took  Reggio  late  on the  24th;  then  the  168th  Infantry  and  the  755th  Tank  Battalion smashed  a  small  garrison at  Parma  late  on  the  25th;  the  135th  Infantry  raced  for  Piacenza,  45  miles  away,  and  reached its  outskirts  by  the  afternoon  of  the  26th.  Here  an  enemy  garrison of  Italian  SS  and  German  troops  held  out  until  the  28th. In  less  than  three  days  the  34th  Division  had  pushed  its  forces 80  miles  from  Modena  to  the  Po  crossings  at  Piacenza  and  had split  the  enemy  right  in  two.  To  the  south  of  the  thin  divisional line — "40  miles  long  and  40  feet  wide" — were  the  German 148th  Grenadier and the Italia  Bersaglieri  Divisions,  trapped  at  the  edge  of  the Apennines  south  of  Highway  9;  to  the  north  was  the  232nd  Grenadier Division,  which  had  managed  to  cross  the  highway  west  of Parma  ahead  of  the  34th  Division  and  assembled  to  defend  itself in  the  Po  loop  south  of  Cremona . The  34th  Division,  strung  out  as  it  was  between three  relatively  intact  divisions,  was  in  no  enviable  position,  yet the  very  fact  that  we  could  get  away  with  such  a  manoeuvre illustrates  clearly  the  end  of  the  German  armies  as  an  organized fighting  force. The  lack  of  communication  between  the  three  German divisions and  their  low  state  of  morale  at  enabled  the 34th  Division  during  26-28  April  to  block  off  the  Piacenza escape  route  on  the  northwest,  and  at  the  same  time  to  devote the  133d  and  168th  Infantry  to  the  systematic  destruction  of the  232nd  Grenadier  Division  south  of  Cremona.  By  the  end  of the  27th,  after  two  days  of  attack  from  all  sides  which  inflicted heavy  casualties  in  men  and  material,  the  232nd  Grenadier  Division was finished as  a  fighting  force  when  a  regimental  commander surrendered  with  his  whole  command;  only  part  of  the  division had  gotten  across  the  Po.  At  this  point  the  34th  Division  was moved  out  of  the  Highway  9  zone,  and  the  remaining  enemy divisions  were  left  to  surrender  to  the  Brazilians  a  few  days  later. The  Brazilian  1st  Division,  after  emerging  into  the  Po  Plain south  of  Modena  on  the  23rrd,  swung  to  the  northwest  at  the  very edge  of  the  Apennines  parallel  to  and  south  of  Highway  9  and the  34th  Division.  The  change  in  direction  pinched  out  the 371st  Infantry,  which  reverted  to  Fifth  Army  control  and  moved to  Modena  to  guard  prisoners  on  the  26th.  Once  the  plain  was reached  advances  were  rapid  against  slight  opposition  until  the 26th,  when  the  division  reconnaissance  units  and  the  200  partisans working  with  them  ran  into  elements  of  the  German 148th  Grenadier  and Italia  Bersaglieri  Divisions  at  the  town  of  Collechia  south  of  Parma. A  serious  fire  fight  developed,  but  the  town  was  cleared  with  a  bag of  300  prisoners  after  reinforcements  were  brought  up. This  engagement  was  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the  two German divisions  trapped  south  of  Highway  9.  After  failing  in  an  attempt on  the  27 th  south  of  Parma  to  break  through  the  34th  Division to  the  Po  the  148th  Grenadier  Division  pulled  back  up  the  Taro Valley  into  the  hills  around  Fornovo.  Heavy  fighting  continued there  for  two  more  days  as  the  Brazilians  mopped  up  the  Germans.  At  1800,  29  April,  the  commanding  generals  of both  the  148th  Grenadier  and  Italia  Bersaglieri  Divisions  formally surrendered  to  the  Brazilians.  By  the  30th  over  13,000  prisoners, 4,000  horses,  and  1,000  trucks  were  taken.  Meanwhile  the  Brazilian 1st  Division  had  assumed  the  34th Division zone  north  of Highway  9  on the 28th; its 1st  Infantry  advanced to Piacenza, and  a  battalion  of  its  11th  Infantry  moved  up  to  finish  off  the pocket  south  of  Cremona.

II Corps

As  IV Corps  was  gathering  at  the  Po on  23  April,  II  Corps  units were  moving  across  the  Panaro,  still  some  20 miles  south of  the Po.  The  following  day  II  Corps arrived  at the  Po  three  divisions abreast  and  immediately  prepared  to  cross.  On  the  left  the 88th Division  moved  over  the  river  at  Revere,  using  the  wrecked railroad  bridge  in  addition  to  assault  craft,  DUKWs,  LCVs,  and Alligators.  The Germans made  ineffectual efforts  in  the  night  to  hinder  the consolidation  by scattered  bombing  and strafing.  The  next  morning  the  88th Division  started  the  20-mile  march  for Verona  by  foot,  jeeps, captured  vehicles,  and  bicycles.  At  2210,  after  a  march  of 40  miles  in  16  hours,  the  2d  Battalion,  351st  Infantry,  and  light armour  reached  the  south  outskirts  of  the  city;  by  daylight  on the  26th  the  city  was  cleared. Late  on  the  24th  the 91st  Division  crossed  the Po at  Sermide  and pushed  toward  Cerea  and  Legnago on the river Adige.  At  Cerea  the  361st  Infantry fought  a night-long  engagement  with  a  large  German  column of  trucks  and  artillery  trying  to  force  a  passage  north  through the  town.  Fortunately  the  Germans  were  more  confused  than the  361st  Infantry,  and  by  morning  they  had  been  cut  to  pieces with  appalling  losses  in  equipment  and  personnel.  Movement  from Cerea  to  the  Adige  was  without  further  incident.  The  2nd  Battalion, 363d  Infantry,  cleared  Legnago  by  noon  on  the  26th  and began  crossing  the  Adige  immediately.  

Farther to the right the  6th  South  African  Armoured  Division  established  a  bridgehead over  the  Po  at  Felonica  on  the  25th. By  26 th April  Fifth  Army  had  split  in  two  the  German  forces  in Italy.  In  IV  Corps  the  10th  Mountain  Division  blocked  off routes  to  the  Brenner  between  Lake  Garda  and  Verona;  the  85th Division  on  the  corps  right  was  moving  through  Verona  to  at- tack the  Adige  Line  defenses  in  the  hills  north  of  the  city;  and  on the  left  Combat  Command  A  was  racing  north  past  Mantua toward  Brescia  with  the  intention  of  swinging  northwest  toward Como.  South  of  the  Po  River,  as  Combat  Command  B  continued mopping  up  north  of  Parma,  the  34th  Division  and  the  Brazilian 1st  Division  had  cut  across  the  path  of  retreat  for  two  enemy divisions  on  the  line  Piacenza-Parma.  

 II Corps  now held  the  line  of  the  Adige  from  Verona  south  to  Legnago with  the  88th  and  91st  Divisions,  and  crossings  were  in  progress. The 6th South African Armoured  Division  on  the  II  Corps  right, with  two  brigades  still  to  cross  the  Po,  was  advancing  to  Adige crossings  south  of  Legnago.  Along  the  Ligurian  Sea  the  troops under the 92nd  Division, after reducing  the  last  Gothic  Line position  on  the  25th,  were  racing  toward  Genoa. New  orders  from  General  Truscott  on  the  26th  directed  Fifth Army  to  cut  off  and  destroy  the  German  forces  in  northwest Italy  and  to  assist  Eighth  Army  in  the  capture  of  Padua.  The main  attack  was  to  drive  across  the  Adige  and  through  the  defences of  the  Adige  Line  before  they  could  be  manned  by  the Germans.  II  Corps  was  to  swing  eastward  on  the  axis  Verona- Vicenza  to  assist  Eighth  Army  in  the  capture  of  Padua  and  to block  escape  routes  to  the  mountains  which  might  be  used  by enemy  forces  along  the  Adriatic.  IV  Corps  was  to  send  one  di- vision north  along  the  eastern  shores  of  Lake  Garda  on  the  axis Verona-Trent-Bolzano  toward  the  Brenner  Pass  exit  and  into  the’ ‘Central  Redoubt"  frequently  mentioned  in  enemy  propaganda  as the  site  for  the  last-ditch  stand  of  the  beleaguered  German  armies; the  1st  Armored  Division  was  to  continue  its  drive  northwest along  the  edge  of  the  Alps  to  Lake  Como;  and the Brazilian 1st  and US.  34th  Divisions  were  to  finish  the  clean-up  job  south  of the  Po.

The  Fifth  Army  fanned  out  to capture  as  many  remaining Germans  as  possible  in  the  Po valley  and  to  forestall  the  formation  of  the Tyrolean  army  reportedly  being  organized  in  the  mountains. Neither  the  Adige  River  nor  the  nearly  unmanned  defences  on  its eastern  bank  proved  a  serious  obstacle. Allied  units  could  practically  at  will  drive  across  country 20  miles  a  day  .  The  Germans  still  tried  to  get  as  many  troops as  they  could  out  of  the  valley  to  the  comparative  safety  of  the Alps,  and  single  units  often  fought  fiercely  to  cover  their  retreat; in  no  case,  however,  did  those  actions  constitute  a  real threat  to the  Allied advance  .  Not  infrequently  our  rear  columns found  places  taken  and  cleared  by  leading  elements  again  in  the hands  of  the  enemy.  The  simple  fact  was  that  no  front  lines existed,  and  the  countryside  swarmed  with  Germans  from  a  wide variety  of  units,  many  apathetically  awaiting  capture  and  others attempting  to  pass  unobserved  through  our  thin  lines  and  into the  mountains. II  Corps crossed  the Adige between  26-28  April  on  a  broad  front  of three  divisions,  each  operating  in  several  high-speed  motorized  and armoured  columns.  Vicenza was  cleared  on the  28th  after  hard  fighting  by  the  350th  Infantry.  The  88th  Division,  which  had  been travelling  astride Highway  53,  fanned  out  to  the  left  into  the hills  and  up  the  Brenta  and  Piave  river  valleys  north  of  Bassano and  Treviso.  The  85th  Division,  attached  to  II  Corps on  30  April, took  over  the  job  of  moving  up  the  Piave  Valley  on  1  May;  the 88th  Division  was  thus  enabled  to  concentrate  its  efforts  on  the Brenta  Valley  and  the  roads  leading  into  it    preparatory  to  continuing  the  advance  on Innsbruck  via  the  Brenner  Pass.  On  the  corps  right  the  91st  and 6  South  African  Armoured  Divisions  drove  east,  the  91st  Division reaching Treviso  on  the  30^th. The  South  Africans  had made  contact  with  Eighth  Army  at  Padua  on  the  29th,  reaching   the  end  of  the  Fifth  Army zone;  the  advance  was  halted,  and  while  the  91st  Division  continued to  mop  up  enemy  resistance  in  its  area  the  South  Africans assembled  and  started  movement  to  the  Milan  area. 

Eighth Army 

The  Eighth  Army  on  the  right, reached  the  Po  on  the  24th.  Efforts  to  trap  the  enemy  south  of the  Po  by  a  junction  with  Fifth  Army  at  Bondeno  were  not entirely  successful,  for  the  1st  and  4th  Parachute  Divisions,  the 26th  Panzer  Division,  and  the  278th  Grenadier  Division  somehow managed  to  get  across  the  Po  in  relatively  good  condition  but with  little  armour  or  artillery.  German  losses  in  men and  equipment  before  Eighth  Army  south  of  the  Po  were very  large.  On  the  25th the Eighth  Army  crossed  the  Po,  and  on  the 27th  the  Adige.  The Germans offered  fierce  resistance before  relinquishing  Padua  to  Indian  troops  and  Venice  to  the  2 New  Zealand  Division,  both  on  the  29th.  The Eighth Army  had  now  virtually  destroyed  the  German  Tenth  Army  and  was  driving rapidly  toward  Austria  and  Yugoslavia.  The  6th  Armoured  Division seized  a  bridge  over  the  Piave  southwest  of  Conegliano  on the  30th,  and  the  New  Zealanders  established  a  bridgehead  farther south.  At  1500,  1  May,  the  2nd  New  Zealand  Division  established contact  with  troops  of  the  Yugoslavian  Army  at  Monfalcone less  than  20  miles  northwest  of  Trieste.  By  2  May,  when  hostilities ceased,  the  armour  had  fanned  out  northwest  and  east  of Udine,  and  the  New  Zealanders  had  entered  Trieste  at  1600,  there to  mop  up  the  last  embers  of  German  resistance.

Endgame

In  the centre IV  Corps  units  breached  the Adige  Line and raced to  block  off  the  exits  from Lake Garda  to  Lake Como.  On the  26th  the  85th  Division  simply  walked  through the  Adige  Line  north  of  Verona The  10th  Mountain Division  moved  up  the  east  shore  of  Lake  Garda  toward  the  exits of  the  Brenner  Pass  and  in  the  demolished  tunnels  of  the  east lake  shore  drive  ran  into  the  most  difficult  fighting  it  had  experienced since  the  breakthrough  in  the  Apennines.  

On 28 April,  the 86th Regiment passed through the 85th, but the advance that day was limited to five miles because the Germans had successfully blown the first of six tunnels through which the lake side road passed at this point. The attempts of the partisans to prevent possible demolition, had failed. On that side of the lake, the cliffs rose so steeply from the edge of the lake that the advance was continued by means of an amphibious operation . This operation caught the German Paratroops and SS men, who had been fighting us in this region, off balance, so that the remaining tunnels were captured intact on the 28th and 29^th. On the morning of the 29^th,  Colonel Darby went forward by speedboat (to get around the blown-out tunnel) and then by jeep to investigate the progress of the 3rd Battalion of the 86th, which had been held up by German fire into the fifth tunnel by 88mm self-propelled at the head of Lake Garda. Five Americans were killed and approximately fifty wounded by a German shell that exploded ten yards into the tunnel. General Hays joined Darby in a speedboat that to return to the division command post. In a matter of seconds, a shell burst in the water about fifty yards to rear of the boat, followed by seven more , fortunately they all missed. Throughout the 28th and 29th German vehicles continued  fleeing northward on Highway 45,protected by one of seven road tunnels on the eastern shore of Lake Garda. At 2400 hours on 29 April, Darby took charge of an amphibious operation which involved sending Company K of the 85th across the lake  in DUKWs to seize Gargnano and thus cut the escape route up Highway 45. This operation was successfully completed by 0200 hours on 30 April. Later in the morning Darby and other division officers crossed the lake to inspect Mussolini's mansion and estate on the outskirts of Gargnano. 

By noon on 30 April the 10th Mountain Division had two columns closing in on the town of Riva at the head of the lake. The advance was slow for the 86th on the east side of the lake, however, because the Germans were able to direct fire from the 88mm guns in the roads from the hills and mountains above the head of the lake. Nevertheless, the 86th had taken Torbole and was pushing on toward Riva, just three miles away. About 1400 hours on 30 April, Darby went forward by DUKW to Torbole. After landing, Darby walked immediately to the 86th regimental command post close to the waterfront. For about half an hour he conferred with the regimental commander and his staff, about three minutes before Darby concluded this conference, a single 88-mm. round was heard bursting somewhere nearby in the town. Darby left the room and walked outside, intending to take a jeep back along the eastern shore to examine the road and tunnels. Two or three of the initial shells landed along the waterfront, but just one of those produced the small fragment that killed Darby instantly .Desperately bad luck considering the war had such a short time left to run , Also desperately unlucky were 25 soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division who drowned at Lake Garda on the night of 30 April, when their amphibious craft (DUKW) sank in one of the squalls typical of Lake Garda.

In  the  western  part  of  the  Po  Valley  IV  Corps  concentrated on  the  German  LXXV Corps  under  Lt.  Gen.  Ernst  Schlemmer,  a still   intact  block  of  two divisions  (34th  Grenadier  and  5th  Mountain  Divisions)  which had  been  guarding  the  Franco-Italian  frontier  and  was  now  withdrawing northeast  past  Turin  under  constant  partisan  attack.   On  the  26th  Combat  Command  A  started  northwest  and  rolled through  Brescia  and  Bergamo  to  Como  on  the  western  arm  of Lake  Como  two  days  later;  en  route  it  met  only  scattered  opposition. Combat  Command  B  followed  across  the  Po  on  the  27th, drove  to  the  Ghedi  Airfield  south  of  Brescia,  and  then  swung  west on  an  axis  south  of  and  parallel  to  that  of  Combat  Command  A. On  the  29th,  the  same  day  that  Troop  B,  91st  Cavalry  Reconnaissance Squadron,  found  Milan  in  the  hands  of  the  partisans, The  1st  Armored  Division  consolidated  positions  north  and  east of  Milan:  Combat  Command  A  on  the  right,  Combat  Command B  on  the  left,  Task  Force  Howze  in  the  centre,  and  the  81st Cavalry  Reconnaissance  Squadron  patrolling  on  the  left  flank.  By the  29th  this  latter  unit  had  pushed  to  the  Ticino  River,  which might  prove  a  good  line  on  which  to  hold  LXXV  Corps.  The next  day  a  IV  Corps  task  force  formally  occupied  Milan. In  three  days,  the  1st  Armored  Division facing  only  scattered  opposition,  had  driven  a wedge  between  German   forces  in  the  mountains  and  those  still  on   the  plain.  In  order  to  strengthen  the  long,  thin  line  the  1st  Armored Division  had  drawn  across  the  top  of  the  valley  and  to  assist in  mopping  up  the  large  enemy  forces  west  of  Milan,  the  34th Division moved  swiftly across  the  Po  and  toward  Bergamo  on  the  28th,  followed  by  the Legnano  Group  on  the  30th  to  Brescia.  On  1  May  the 34th  Division relieved  1st  Armored  Division  reconnaissance  elements  on the  Ticino  River  northwest  of  Milan.  It  then  took  Novara  west of  the  Ticino  the  next  day  against  no  opposition;  elements  were also  sent  northwest  30  miles  to  Biella  at  the  edge  of  the  western Alpine  chain.  Drawing  the  noose  across  the  top  of  the  valley  onthe  line  Ticino  River-Novara-Biella  left  surrender  as  the  only alternative  to  LXXV  Corps,  which  was  concentrating  northeast of  Turin  and  south  of  the  34th  Division. 

Conclusion 

The Fifth  Army's  long  thrust  straight  north  from  the  Apennines to  Lake  Garda  and  thence  across  the  top  of  the  valley  to  the  east and  west  had  first  split  the  German  armies  in  Italy  in  two  and closed  the  door  of  retreat  to  the  Alps.  In the east the British Eighth Army  chased  the  Germans north  along  the  Adriatic  coast;  in  the  west  the  92nd  Division tore  along  the  Ligurian  coast  to  Genoa;  and  south  of  the  Po the  Brazilian  1st  Division  and  for  a  while  the  34th  Division rounded  up  enemy  forces  caught  in  the  Apennines.  The  latter project  was  completed  successfully  by  the  29th,  and  on  the  next two  days  the  Brazilian  1st  Division  fanned  out  to  Alessandria and  Cremona. On 27th April, in Genoa  4,000  troops  commanded by  General  Meinhold,  had  surrendered  to  the partisans  the  day  before,  but  the  port  garrison  and  a  detachment of  marines  on  top  of  a  hill  overlooking  the  harbour  held  out  until the  next  day.  Beyond Genoa on  the  right  the  442nd  Infantry  moved  north of Genoa into  the  Lombardy  Plain  to  capture  Alessandria and  its  garrison  of  3,000  men  on  the  28th.  There  they linked up with  the  Brazilians. Contact  between  the  92ndd  Division and  IV  Corps  was  made  at  Pavia.  Turin was  cleared  by  the  partisans  on  the  28th  and  was  reached  by  American troops  on  the  30^th. On the same day the 473d Infantry met French colonial troops on the coast. By that time the Germans in northwest Italy were surrendering on every side.

On 2  May  hostilities  in  Italy  ceased  in  accordance  with  terms  of  unconditional  surrender  signed  by  representatives  of  General  Vietinghoff,  Commander-in-Chief  of  Army  Group  Southwest,  at Caserta  on  29  April.  The  20 month Italian campaign had finished   with  a  final,  smashing  offensive  which  in  19 days  reduced  the Germans  into  a  fleeing  rabble  with  neither  defences,  organization, nor  equipment